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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS IN NEW YORK:
SUGGESTIONS FOR FIXING AN OVERBROAD,
OUTDATED STATUTE
BRANDON R. WHITEt
INTRODUCTION
Like the mentally disabled generally, discrimination against
mentally disabled parents has a long and dark history.1 In recent
years, discrimination against individuals with mental disabilities
has been relieved somewhat by a shift in perceptions of mental
disorders and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2
However, strong prejudices and biases towards parents with mental
disabilities remain entrenched and about three quarters of states
maintain statutes that allow for termination of parental rights on
the basis of a parent's disability. 3 Moreover, with state courts
throughout the country consistently refusing to apply the ADA to
termination statutes, the ADA has failed to provide mentally
disabled parents any protection.' Indeed, "[t]hese parents are the
only distinct community of Americans who must struggle to retain
custody of their children." 5
t J.D. Candidate, 2016, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.S. Biological Sciences:
Neurobiology & Behavior, 2007, Cornell University. Many thanks to Professor
Martha McCluskey for her help and guidance in developing this topic.
1 NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS
OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN
14 (2012),
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sep272012 [hereinafter "ROCKING THE

CRADLE"].

2 Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct to the
Terminationof the ParentalRights ofIndividualswith Mental Disabilities,16 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 387, 407-08 (2000).
3 Jennifer Mathis, Keeping Families Together: Preservingthe Rights of Parents
with PsychiatricDisabilities,46 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y

517, 518 (2013).
1 ROCKING THE CRADLE,
5

Id.

supra note 1, at 14.
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New York is one of the biggest offenders. 6 Not only does
New York's termination statute allow for termination on the sole
basis of a parent's disability, it also withholds important procedural
protections specifically from mentally disabled parents.' These
provisions almost certainly violate the ADA, and they may be in
violation of the United States Constitution.8 Equally important,
however, they are fundamentally unfair.
Unfortunately, there are circumstances where parents with
mental disabilities are not and never will be able to adequately care
for their children. 9 When the consequence of failing to terminate a
parent's rights is the health and welfare of children, some
compromise needs to be made.1" The appropriate solution,
therefore, cannot be a wholesale excision of mental disability as
grounds for termination of parental rights, as some advocates have
sought to do." Rather, this paper proposes that the appropriate
solution is to narrowly limit the scope of the statute to reach only
those parents who can be determined, with reasonable certainty, to
be unfit to care for their children.
Part I of this paper outlines the law surrounding termination
of parental rights and discusses the constitutional and other federal
law imposing restrictions on state termination proceedings as well
as a general overview of the child welfare system. Part II discusses
New York's termination statute, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b, in
6

See, e.g., Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of

Mentally DisabledParents Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct and State
Law, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 112, 170 (2007).
7 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4), (6) (McKinney 2015).
8 See

infraParts I.A, III.
9See, e.g., Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
and the Parental Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or
Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1415, 1449 (1995).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 2015) ("This article is
designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or
mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing. It is designed to provide a due process of law for determining when the
state, through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent on
behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met.").
11 See infra Part VI.
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detail, particularly as it applies to mentally disabled parents.
Though this article does not dwell on the ADA and I do not rely on
it for my proposed solution, I would be remise not to mention it
and Part III analyzes the ADA and its failure in protecting mentally
disabled parents in New York. Part IV discusses an attempt to
strike the mental disability grounds from § 384-b and how this
failed because of beliefs that doing so would endanger children.
Part V attempts to separate the legitimate concerns from the
prejudices and biases underlying the retention of mental disability
grounds in § 384-b. Finally, Part VI of this paper proposes an
alternative to completely eliminating the grounds that more fairly
balances the rights of the mentally disabled without sacrificing the
safety of children.
I.

THE LAW SURROUNDING TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. The right to raise one's children is a
fundamental right, and the Constitution
imposes restrictions on the states' ability to
interfere with that right

The substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment12
"provides heightened protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." 13 It is well
established that parental rights are one such protected interest. 14
Indeed, "a natural parent's desire for and right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children" is a "commanding" interest that is "far more precious
than any property right."1 5 Moreover, the common law has long
recognized that the natural parent is generally the most suitable
amend. XIV.
Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (199 7 ).
14 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
15 Santosky v. Krammer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
12U.S. CONST.
13
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guardian for a child. 16 Accordingly, parents are entitled to a
presumption that they are fit to raise their children. 17
Parental rights are not absolute, however.18 States have a
legitimate parenspatriaeinterest in promoting the welfare of the
children within their borders and a state may, in the course of
protecting these children, interfere with parental rights.19 To
interfere to any degree with parental rights, the state must
overcome the presumption of parental fitness.2"
When a state finds it necessary to permanently remove a
child from her parent and, by doing so, terminate parental rights,
the state's interest and the parent's fundamental rights come into
direct conflict.21 Termination is a unique kind of deprivation that
acts "to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental
relationship. ' 22 Accordingly, Due Process guarantees parents
increased procedural protections during termination proceedings.23
Specifically, due process demands that termination proceedings be
conducted on an individualized basis 24 and the state must show, by
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.); see also
TUPAC SHAKUR, DEAR MAMA (Interscope 1994) ("[A]in't a woman alive that
could take my mama's place.").
17 Parham,422 U.S. at 602.
18 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 97 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
16

19 Santosky, 455

U.S. at 766.

Parham,442 U.S. at 602.
21 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
22 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (quoting Rivera v. Minnich, 483
U.S. 574, 580 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re
Application of Ohel Children's Home and Family Servs., 824 N.Y.S.2d 764
(Fam. Ct. 2006) ("[T]he determination to terminate parental rights in the civil
area is the jurisprudential equivalent of capital punishment in the criminal
20

area ...").
23
24

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
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5

"clear and convincing evidence,, 2 5 that a parent is unfit to raise
26
their child.
B. The Adoption and Safe Family Act grants
parents additional protection from state
interference with parental rights
Through the Spending Clause,2 7 the federal government

imposes additional restrictions on termination of parental rights
proceedings that serve to further protect parental rights. 28 The most
significant of these restrictions are imposed by the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 (AFSA) which amended the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act (ACWA). 2 9 As part of the Social
Security code, these provisions act as funding mandates." To
receive federal reimbursement for foster-care and adoption
services, the child welfare laws of a state must be in line with the
provisions of the AACWA as amended by the AFSA. 31 All of the
states have adopted the provisions of the AFSA in their child
welfare statutes. 2

"Clear and convincing" evidence is an intermediate standard that falls
between "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." See,
25

e.g.,
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768.
26

Id. at 769.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention
Stifled Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
281,289 (2007).
29 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 (1997).
30 John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Refraining Parental Rights As
FamilialRights in Termination ofParentalRights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS
J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 51, 57 (2014).
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-73 (2012).
32 Maryana Zubok, Family Law Chapter: Termination of Parental Rights, 5
27
28

GEo. J. GENDER & L. 587, 590 (2004).
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The AFSA's principal goal is ensuring the welfare of
children. 33 It does so by emphasizing permanency and expediency
in providing for the placement of children. 34 To further these aims,
the AFSA includes a number of provisions intended to make the
termination process quicker and more efficient.35 These provisions
include a provision for concurrent adoption planning prior to
termination3 6 and a requirement that states file a termination
petition if a child has spent fifteen of the last twenty-two months in
foster care.37
Despite these mandates, the AFSA recognizes that
permanent placement with the natural parent is the preferred
outcome for children and that termination is a last resort.38
Accordingly, the AFSA requires that state child protective
agencies make "reasonable efforts" to keep families together
during two different periods. 39 First, the state must make
reasonable efforts to prevent children from being removed from
their parents in the first place.4" Second, if it becomes necessary to
temporarily remove a child from her parents, the state must make
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. 41 The AFSA, however,
does not define "reasonable efforts" and the states are left with the
discretion to define the term. 42
There are limited situations where reasonable efforts to
maintain or reunite families are not required.43 The AFSA exempts
33 42 U.S.C. § 6 7 1(a)(15)

("[T]he child's health and safety shall be the

paramount concern.").
31 Zubok, supra note 32, at 596-97. Congress was concerned that many children

were spending too much time in foster care and the ASFA was passed to speed
up the adoption process. Id.
35 Halloran, supra note 30, at 59.
36

45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(4) (2015).

37 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
38 Zubok, supra note 32, at 597.
39 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B).
40
41
42

§ 671(a)(15)(B)(i).
§ 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L.

REv. 321, 325 (2005).
43 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)-(iii).
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states from making reasonable efforts when there is a judicial
determination that (1) the parent was convicted of (a) murder or
voluntary manslaughter of a sibling of the child; (b) assisting in
such an act; or (c) felony assault causing serious bodily injury to
the child or one of his or her siblings; (2) parental rights towards
another of the child's parents has already been terminated; or (3)
the parent subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, as
defined by state statute.44
C. The child welfare system: a broad overview
Aside from constitutional due process requirements and the
funding mandate of ASFA discussed above, ensuring child welfare
is a duty that falls primarily to the individual states.45 States do so
through their child welfare systems.46 The child welfare system is a
group of services that includes Child Protective Services (CPS),
other public agencies, the courts, private child welfare agencies,
and other organizations which provide services for parents and
children. 47 The purpose of the Child Welfare System is to
"promote the well-being of children by ensuring safety, achieving
permanency, and strengthening families to care for their children
48
successfully."
Most families who become involved with the child welfare
system do so through reports of abuse or neglect. 49 In the majority
of states, New York included,5 ° CPS is responsible for responding
44

1d.

Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) ("[D]omestic relations ... [are] an
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States.").
46 Children's Bureau, Fact Sheet: How the Child Welfare System Works 1-2
(Feb. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/cpswork.pdf.
47
1d. at 2-3.
4
1ld. at 1.
45

49

1d. at2.

N.Y. Soc. SERV.

50

LAW

§ 423 (McKinney 2015).
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to these reports. 51 First, the report is screened for credibility and, if
it is found credible, investigated.52 If CPS believes that action must
be taken to protect the child, CPS will initiate a court action. 53 If
the court agrees that removal is necessary, the child will be
temporarily removed from the home and placed in foster care.54
Following the temporary removal of a child, periodic hearings are
held to determine the status of the case and whether continued
removal is necessary.55 Eventually, if the requirements set out in
the state's termination statute are met, parental rights may be
terminated.56

II.

NEW YORK SOCIAL SERVICES LAW
SECTION 384-B AFFORDS MENTALLY
DISABLED PARENTS SIGNIFICANTLY
LESS PROTECTION OF THEIR PARENTAL
RIGHTS THAN OTHER PARENTS

New York codified the ASFA's provisions in its
termination statute, N.Y. Soc. Law § 384-b. 5 New York balances
its interest in protecting children with the fundamental rights of
most parents by requiring that the state (1) make "diligent efforts"
to reunite families 58 and (2) show that termination is in the best
interest of the child. 59 New York requires neither of these prior to
termination of a mentally disabled parent's rights and, in doing so,
it fails to offer mentally disabled parents the protection entitled to
them.60
51
5

Children's Bureau, supranote 46, at 3.

54

HON. WILLIAM

2 Id. at 3-4.
5
3 _d. at4.

G.

JONES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT USER MANUAL SERIES:

WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION
55
5

26-27 (2006).

Id. at 32-34.

6 Id. at 32-36.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW

§ 384-b (McKinney 2015).
§ 384-b(7)(a), (8)(a)(iv).
51 § 384-b(8)(f); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 623, 625(a) (McKinney 2015).
60 See N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 384-b(6).
57
58
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A. Section 384-b's stated purpose and grounds for
termination
In its statement of legislative findings and intent, § 384-b
declares that "the health and safety of children is of paramount
importance., 61 The statute recognizes that children need permanent
living arrangements "to develop and thrive" and that "it is
generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to
the birth parent ... unless the best interests of the child would be

thereby endangered., 62 As such, "the state's first obligation is to
help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it
if the child has already left the home. 63 Termination of parental
rights should only be sought "when it is clear that the birth parent
cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the child and
when continued foster care is not an appropriate plan for the
64
child.",
Section 384-b provides five grounds for terminating
parental rights, each of which must be proved by "clear and
convincing evidence" 65: (1) both parents of the child are dead and
no guardian has been lawfully appointed 66; (2) the parent
abandoned the child for six months 67 ; (3) the parent is "presently
and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or
mental retardation, to provide proper and adequate care for a child"
who has been temporarily removed for one year 68 ; (4) the child has
61
62

§ 384-b(1)(a).
§ 384-b(1)(a)(i)-(ii).

63 § 384-b(1)(a)(iii).
64 § 384-b(1)(a)(iv).
65
66

67

§ 384-b(3)(g)(i).
§ 384-b(4)(a).
§ 384-b(4)(b).

§ 384-b(4)(c). Except where it is necessary to distinguish between the two,
this paper will refer to the "mental illness" and "mental retardatiof' grounds
collectively as "mental disability" grounds.
61
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been permanently neglected6 9 ; and (5) the parent "severely or
repeatedly abused" the child.70
B. Bifurcation of termination proceedings: "due
diligence" and the best interests of the child
There are some problems with even including mental
disability as grounds for termination. 71 New York truly tramples on
mental disabled parents'
rights, however, by modifying
termination of parental rights proceedings for mentally disabled
parents and denying those parents the same protections that other
parents are guaranteed.7 2
TPR proceedings based on neglect and abuse grounds in
New York are conducted in two separate hearings. 73 First, a factfinding hearing is held to determine whether the grounds for
termination have been met.7 4 Second, a dispositional hearing is
held to determine the best interests of the child.7 5
During the fact-finding hearing, in addition to proving that
the parent neglected or abused the child, the state is required to
show that it engaged in "diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship. 7 6 Diligent efforts are defined
as "reasonable attempts by an authorized agency to assist, develop
and encourage a meaningful relationship between the parent and

69
71
71

§ 384-b(4)(d).
§ 384-b(4)(e).

See, e.g., Rachel L. Lawless, When Love Is Not Enough: Termination of
ParentalRights When the ParentsHave a MentalDisability, 37 CAP. U. L. REV.
491, 527-28 (2008).
72

See infra Parts VI.C-D.

73§ 384-b(8)(f); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 622-31 (McKinney 2015).
71 N.Y, FAm. CT. ACT § 622 ("'[Flact-finding hearing' means in the case of a

petition for the commitment of the guardianship and custody of a child, a
hearing to determine whether the allegations required by [§ 384-b] are supported
by clear and convincing proof.").

§ 384-b(8)(f); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 623, 625(a).
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a), (8)(a)(iv).

75 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
76
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child.", 77 These efforts include providing the parent with services
and other assistance to address issues effecting parenting ability,
developing a service plan with the family, and arranging for
visitation.7 8
After the fact-finding hearing is complete, a dispositional
hearing is held to determine whether termination is in the best
interests of the child. 79 Even if the grounds for termination have
been proved (despite the diligent efforts of the state), termination
may be denied if it would not serve the best interests of the child.80
When determining the best interests of the child the court has
discretion to consider a number of factors, including the child's
bond with the parent,8 1 the child's wishes,8 2 and the likelihood of
the child being adopted.83
When termination of parental rights is sought on mental
disability grounds, however, parents are afforded much less
protection. First, § 384-b does not require that the state
demonstrate diligent efforts to reunite families or strengthen
parental relationships, greatly diminishing the state's burden
during the fact-finding hearing.8 4 Though some courts have
considered a lack of diligent efforts to reflect negatively on proof
that the parent would be unable to provide adequate care for the
child in the future,8 5 courts have consistently declined to read an
77 § 384-b(7)(f).

78 Id.
71 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 623 ("'[D]ispositional hearing' means a hearing to
determine what order of disposition should be made in accordance with the best
interests of the child."); see also In re Hannah D., 740 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (App.
Div. 2002).
Inre HannahD., 740 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
81 In re Aidan D., 870 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (App. Div. 2009).
82 In re Shakima Renee M., 841 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271-72 (App. Div. 2007).
83 In re Jaiheem M.S., 879 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (App. Div. 2009).
84 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6) (McKinney 2015); see also, e.g., In re
Harris AA, 727 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (App. Div. 2001); In re Jason Anthony S.,
717 N.Y.S.2d 197 ,198 (App. Div. 2000); In re Belinda S., 592 N.Y.S.2d 372,
373 (App. Div. 1993).
85 See, e.g., In re W.W. Children, 736 N.Y.S.2d 567, 577-78 (Fam. Ct. 2001).
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actual requirement that the state demonstrate these efforts into the
statute.86
Second, § 384-b includes no requirement for a dispositional
hearing when the termination grounds are mental illness or mental
retardation.87 Courts may, and occasionally do, hold such
hearings.88 However, this is an action taken at a court's
discretion.89 A best interests hearing is not required by the statute
and courts often neglect to exercise their discretion to hold one.9"
C. Proving mental illness and mental retardation in
termination proceedings under § 384-b
In addition to problems in how New York conducts
termination proceedings, § 384-b further impinges on the parental
rights of the mentally disabled by how it goes about proving
mental disability in the first place.91 As will be discussed in more
depth below, § 384-b's definitions for "mental illness" and "mental
retardation" are overbroad and lack sufficient standards for expert
testimony.92 As a result, many fit parents are liable to be
unjustifiably found to satisfy the termination grounds.93
"Mental illness" is defined in § 384-b as "an affliction with
a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a
disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking or
judgment." 94 "Mental retardation" is defined as "subaverage
86

See, e.g., In re HarrisAA, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 771; In re Jamnie CC, 540

N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (App. Div. 1989).

§ 384-b(6). New York is the only state that does not require proof that an
agency provided reunification services or a court decision allowing the agency
to forego reunification services. Margolin, supra note 6, at 150.
87

88 See, e.g., In re W. W. Children,736 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
89

See, e.g., In re Wilson, 828 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (App. Div. 2007); In re Harris

A.A., 727 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
90 See, e.g., In re Wilson, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
91 See infra Part VI.A.
92 See infra Part VI.A.
93 See infra Part VI.A.
94 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6)(a) (McKinney 2015).
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intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental
95
period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior."
To terminate parental rights on the basis of mental illness or
retardation, the conditions of either must be "to such an extent that
if the child were placed in or returned to the custody of the parent,
96
the child would be in danger of becoming a neglected child."
Termination of parental rights may be effected by proof of
mental disability alone, and no showing of past neglect or abuse is
necessary. 97 The existence of mental illness or retardation, as well
as disability's future effects on the parent, must be shown by "clear
and convincing proof." 98 However, the parent's future ability to
provide care for the child does not need to be proved with much
certainty and "the mere possibility that [a parent]'s condition, with
proper treatment, could improve in the future is insufficient to
[defeat a termination action]." 99
To make out such proof, the statute requires only the
testimony of a single psychiatrist or psychologist who has
examined the parent. 100 The statute includes no specifications or
requirements for this examination. 101 If the parent refuses to submit
to an examination or is otherwise unavailable for one, the
psychologist or psychiatrist is permitted to testify without an
examination and base her determination on "other available
information" such as hospital or clinic records. 102

95

§ 384-b(6)(b).

§ 384-b(6)(a)-(b).
1n re Mathew Z., 720 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (App. Div. 2001).
98 § 384-b(3)(g)(i).
99 In re Joseph T., 632 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting In re
Vaketa Y., 528 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (App. Div. 1988)) (internal quotation marks
and original alterations omitted).
100 § 384-b(6)(e).
101 See § 384-b(6).
96

97

102

§ 384-b(6)(e).
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THE ADA AND ITS APPLICATION TO § 384B

Section 384-b's discriminatory treatment of mentally
disabled parents should be in violation of the ADA's prohibition of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 10 3 However,
with New York's courts consistently holding, in error, that the
ADA does not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings,
104
the ADA has offered no protection to mentally disabled parents.
A. Title II of the ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination
of discrimination
against
individuals
with
disabilities." 10 5 Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from
discriminating against individuals with disabilities, or otherwise
excluding them from participation in or denying them the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities offered by the public
entity. 10 6 To avoid discrimination or unequal access and
participation, a public entity is required to accommodate for
individuals with disabilities by making reasonable modifications to
its policies, practices, procedures unless making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity. 107
A public entity includes any state or local government or
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a state or local government.10 8 The
implementing regulations state that Title II applies to "all services,

103

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

104See, e.g., In re La'Asia Lanae S., 803 N.Y.S.2d 568, 569 (App. Div. 2005).
105 42 U.S.C § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
106

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

107

28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2015).
42 U.S.C. § 12131.

108
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programs, and activities provided or made available by public
entities. '"109
B. The ADA applies to termination of parental
rights proceedings and § 384-b violates the
ADA's mandates
The ADA should certainly apply to termination
proceedings."' The courts and child protective services are
departments and agents of state and local government and, as such,
are undoubtedly "public entities." ' Additionally, though Title II
does not explicitly include termination proceedings within the
definition of "services," the statute's broad definitions should
include these proceedings. 2 In fact, the Second Circuit has gone
as far to describe the phrase "services, programs, or activities" as
"a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public
entity." 1"
Next, applying the ADA, § 384-b fails to measure up. In
New York, when children are removed because they have been
abused or neglected, § 384-b requires the state to make diligent
efforts to reunite those children with their parents.1 1 4 Even after
abuse or neglect and the state's diligent efforts are proven, a
dispositional hearing must be held to determine whether
termination is in the best interests of the child.1 15 Termination of
parental rights is only appropriate when these efforts were

109 28 C.F.R. § 35.102.

110 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 2, at 409-11.
111See, e.g., id.at 411.
112 See, e.g., Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998).
113Noel

v. N.Y.C. Taxi and Limousine Comim'n, 687 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2012)

(quoting Innovating Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 42

(2d Cir. 199 7 )) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a), (8)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2015).
115

§ 384-b(8)(f); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 623, 625(a) (McKinney 2015).
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taken.1 16When children are removed because their parents are
mentally disabled, the statute includes no such requirements. H7
Thus, § 384-b explicitly affords an entire class of parents less legal
protection (of a constitutionally protected fundamental right, no
less"'), by reason of their disability. It seems obvious that these
provisions would be a violation of the ADA. Especially in light of
the AFSA's requirement for reasonable efforts. 1 9
C. New York's courts, have failed to hold that
the ADA applies to termination of parental
rights proceedings
The courts in New York have not found the ADA's
applicability to § 384-b so obvious. Instead, New York courts have
held on multiple occasions that the ADA offers mentally disabled
parents no protection during termination of parental rights
proceedings. 2 ° The courts reach this conclusion on two different
116

N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW

§ 384-b(7)(a), (8)(a)(iv), (8)(f); N.Y. FAM.

CT. ACT §§

623, 625(a).
117 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6).
118 Santosky v. Krammer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
119 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012).
120 See, e.g., In re La'Asia Lanae S., 803 N.Y.S.2d 568, 569 (App. Div. 2005); In
re Custody of La'Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d 898, 908-09 (Fam. Ct. 2002); In re
Chance Jahmel B., 723 N.Y.S.2d 634, 639-40 (Fam. Ct. 2001). New York is far
from alone here; all of the states that have considered whether the ADA applies
to termination proceedings have found similarly. See, e.g., In re Antony B., 735
A.2d 893, 899 (Conn. 1999) (holding that ADA is not a defense to termination
and does not impose obligations on state in termination proceeding); Stone v.
Daviess Cnty. Div. of Children & Family Serv., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that ADA does not apply to termination statute because, in
passing the ADA, "Congress did not intend to change the substantive obligations
imposed by unrelated state statutes"); In re B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that termination of parental rights proceedings are not
"services, programs, or activities" under ADA); In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 721
(Vt. 1997) ("TPR proceedings are not 'services, programs or activities' within
the meaning of Title II of the ADA."); In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that ADA does not apply to termination
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grounds.12 1 Reasoning that "the ADA was designed to deal with
access to public services and accommodations" the courts have
held that "parental rights are not 'services, programs, or
activities." '
In the alternative, courts have held that even, if
termination proceedings were "services, programs, or activities,"
the ADA does nothing "to alter the rights of parents in state
termination of parental rights statutes" and "nothing in the ADA
suggests that denial of a TPR is an appropriate remedy for an ADA
violation." 123
As noted by numerous legal commentators, these
conclusions are in error.124 First, whether the ADA was or was not
"designed to deal with access to public services and
accommodations" has no bearing on whether the ADA applies in
proceedings because "[t]he duty to make a diligent effort to provide courtordered services is defined by the [termination] statutes and not the ADA" and
"[t]he ADA does not increase those responsibilities or dictate how those
responsibilities must be discharged").
121 See In re Custody of La Asia, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09; In re Chance Jahmel
B., 723 N.Y.S.2d at 63 9-40.
122 In re Custody ofLa Asia, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
123 Id. at 909 (quoting In re BKF, 704 So. 2d at 317) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court in In re Chance Jahmel B. suggested that the ADA might
properly be raised during permanency hearings prior to termination or as the
basis for a separate action for damages in federal court. 723 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
124 See, e.g., Kate Duncan Butler, Dramatic Leaps in the Right Direction:
ProtectingPhysically Disabled Parents in Child Welfare Law, 47 FAM. L.Q.
437, 447 (2013); Alexis C. Collentine, Respecting Intellectually Disabled
Parents:A Callfor Change in State TerminationofParentalRights Statutes, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 535, 562 (2005); Jeanne M. Kaiser, Victimized Twice: The
Reasonable Efforts Requirementin Child Protection Cases When ParentsHave
A Mental Illness, 11 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 3, 20 (2011); Kerr,
supra note 2, at 412-13; Kathryn A. LaFortune & Wendy Dunne DiChristina,
Representing Clients with Mental Disabilitiesin Custody Hearings: Using the
ADA to Help in A Best-Interests-ofthe-ChildDetermination, 46 FAM. L.Q. 223,
230 (2012); Dale Margolin, supra note 6, at 150-51; Mathis, supra note 3, at
519-20; Jude T. Pannell, Unaccommodated:Parents with Mental Disabilitiesin
Iowa's Child Welfare System and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 59 DRAKE
L. REv. 1165, at 1176 (2011).
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other contexts.1 25 As the United States Supreme Court has
explained, "the fact that [the ADA] can be applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
126
It demonstrates breadth."
Second, simply put, the ADA prohibits discrimination by
public entities. 127 The ADA may do nothing "to alter the rights of
parents in state termination of parental rights statutes" specifically
but it does alter the rights of individuals with disabilities
generally. 128 Explicitly affording parents with mental disabilities
less protection during termination proceedings is discrimination
and prohibited by the ADA. 129
IV.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO STRIKE
THE MENTAL DISABILITY GROUNDS FROM §
384-B WAS DEFEATED BECAUSE OF
CONCERNS THAT DOING SO WOULD
ENDANGER CHILDREN

Advocates for the mentally disabled have not taken these
slights laying down. During the 2008-09 New York Legislative
Session, Senator Shirley Huntley,1 3 ° D-Queens, and Assemblyman
Peter Rivera,13 1 D-Bronx, proposed legislation to eliminate the
mental disability provision from the list of grounds for termination

121 In re Custody ofLa Asia, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 909.

Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
121 In re Custody ofLa Asia, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
129 See Noel, 687 F.3d at 68.
130 In 2008-09, Senator Huntley was the Chairwoman of the Senate Mental
Health Committee. Cara Matthews, Parents With PsychiatricDisabilities Won't
Get Custody Change This Year, GANNETT NEWS, May 30, 2009,
http://www.mhanys.org/publications/mhupdate/updatelatest.htm.
131In 2008-09, Assemblyman Rivera was the Chairman of the Assembly Mental
Health Committee. Matthews, supra note 130, at 105.
126
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in N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. § 384-b. 13 2 A coalition of over forty
organizations lobbied in support of the proposed legislation. 133
In support of the bills, the coalition released a
13 4
memorandum outlining the justifications for the amendment.
The coalition centered its argument on three principles. 13 5 First,
parents with mental disabilities are afforded inferior Due Process
rights. 136 Other grounds for termination require (1) a showing that
the state made diligent efforts to reunite the separated family and
(2) a separate hearing to determine whether termination is in the
best interests of the child. 13 7 Neither is required for termination on
mental disability grounds.13 8
Second, the grounds impact "countless individuals."13' 9 In
2008, nine percent of all termination petitions, amounting to nearly
300 people, were based on mental disability grounds. 14' This
number, sizeable by itself, does not account for the many
individuals who felt compelled to voluntarily surrender their
132

Mental Health Ass'n in New York State, Termination ofParentalRights Bill

Update,

June

5,

2009,

http://www.mhanys.org/publications/mhupdate/

updatelatest.htm [hereinafter "Bill Update"]. The Senate and Assembly bills
were numbered A06668 and S02835 respectively and are available on the
website for New York State Assembly. See Bill No. A06668, N.Y. STATE
ASSEMBLY (Jan. 6, 2010), http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default fld=&bn =
A06668&term2009; Bill No. S02835, N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY (Jan. 6, 2010),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/? default fld=&bn=S02835 &tenn2009.
133Bill Update, supra note 132. The Legal Services of Central New York and
Mental Health Association in New York State played a principal role in this
coalition. See id.; Associated Press, Report: DisabledParentsFaceBias, Loss of
Kids, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2012 [hereinafter "Disabled Parents Face Bias"].
134 Coalition Against Parental Termination Discrimination, Why New York State
must Eliminate Mental Illness and Mental Retardation as Grounds for
Termination of ParentalRights, (2009), http://www.mhanys.org/publications/
mhupdate/updatelatest.htm [hereinafter CoalitionMemo].
13 5

Td.

136 Td.
137 Td.
138
139

Td.
Td.

140 Td.
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parental rights because of their disabilities.141 Nor does it account
for those who, because of fear of losing their children, failed to
acknowledge their illness and seek treatment. 142
Third, a great deal of the case law for termination on
mental illness or retardation grounds was decided before the ADA
was enacted. 143 While the courts have found the grounds to be
constitutional, this does not mean the grounds constitute "good law
or sound policy. 144 Moreover, termination for mental illness145or
retardation should be discriminatory under Title II of the ADA.
The bid to pass the bill failed. 146 The failure was largely the
result of strong opposition from the Public Welfare Association,
which represents New York's local services districts. 147 The
Association's primary concern was that removing the grounds
would endanger children. 148 According to the Association, § 384-b
does not allow for removal simply through the existence of a
mental disability, it requires the presence of a disability that
renders a parent unable to provide adequate care for their
children. 149 The mental disability grounds ensure that, when
parents are unable to care for their children, the children don't
"languish" in foster care. 150

141Id.
142 1d.

143Id.
144 1d.
145

Jd.

Disabled Parents Face Bias, supra note 133.
141 Matthews, supra note 130.
148 Id.; see also Disabled Parents Face Bias, supra note 133.
146

149Id.
150

Matthews, supranote 130.

2015-2016

TPR for Mentally Disabled Parents in N.Y.

V.

THERE IS SOME MERIT TO THE CONCERNS
OF THOSE WHO OPPOSED REMOVING THE
MENTAL DISABILITY GROUNDS FROM § 384B, BUT THESE CONCERNS ARE LARGELY
THE RESULT OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE

The mental disability grounds in § 384-b unfairly
disadvantages mentally disabled parents and are based on an
outdated understanding of mental disabilities. 151 The view that
individuals with mental disabilities make unfit parents is largely
based on two prejudiced presumptions. 152 First, that parents with
mental disabilities will inevitably mistreat children or otherwise
fail to provide adequate care. 153 Second, that parenting deficiencies
of the mentally disabled are immutable and providing support or
services to such parents would therefore be pointless. 154 These
presumptions, largely false, are deep-seated and resistant to
change. 155
On the other hand, while the opponents of the proposed
amendment overstate the problem, their concerns are not entirely
without merit. Mental disabilities are, to some extent, connected to
parenting and child outcomes. 156 In extreme situations, some
parents actually are, by reason of their mental disability, unfit
parents that will never be able to provide adequate care for their
children. 157 When this is the case, § 384-b protects children and
prevents long stays in foster care with a "faultless" determination
151Watkins,

supranote 9, at 1448.
See, e.g., David McConnell & Gwynnyth Llewellyn, Stereotypes, Parents
with IntellectualDisabilityand ChildProtection,24 J. SOC. WELFARE AND FAM.
L.
297, 302 (2002); Watkins, supranote 9, at 1448-5 1.
15
152

3

154

Id.

Id.

155 Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 2, at 403-04.
156

See, e.g.,

JOANNE NICHOLSON ET. AL., CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PARENTS WITH

54 (2001).
See, e.g., Watkins, supranote 9, at 1449.

MENTAL ILLNESS AND THEIR FAMILIES
157
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that does not accuse a mentally disabled parent of wrongful
conduct. 158
It is extraordinarily difficult to reconcile these issues. The
stakes in termination proceedings are high. Denying termination
when it is appropriate places children in the direct care of
individuals who cannot, or will not, provide them with appropriate
care.159 Not only can this negatively impact a child's development,
but in extreme cases it may place a child's health and life in
jeopardy.16 ° On the other hand, terminating parental rights, even
where it is appropriate, permanently severs the parent-child bond,
and can result in adverse consequences for both the child and
parent. 161 Because of this, it is always preferable to improve
inadequate parenting and return a child to the home. 162 However,
foster care can be very damaging for children and efforts to reunite
cannot go on forever. 163 TPR proceedings necessarily require the
164
fine balancing of a multitude of often conflicting concerns.
New York's termination statute needs to be fixed.
However, the opponents of the 2009 amendment had legitimate
concerns that should be addressed. 165 The appropriate solution is
not to strike the mental disability grounds from § 384-b in their
entirety. The appropriate solution is rather to modify the statute to
limit its reach to those parents whom the evidence actually
suggests are likely to be unable to provide adequate care for their
children. To determine the proper balance, the legitimate concerns
158

See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6)(d) (McKinney 2015).

See, e.g., In re Alijah C., 1 N.Y.3d 375, 377 (2004).
See, e.g., id.
161Nina Wasow, PlannedFailure: California'sDenial ofReunification Services
159

160

to Parents with Mental Disabilities,31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183,
218-19 (2006).
162 Zubok, supra note 32, at 596-97.
163Kaiser, supra note 124, at 22-23.
164 Halloran, supra note 30, at 54-55; Shawndra Jones, Working Group Report:
State Intervention in the Family: Child ProtectiveProceedingsand Termination
ofParentalRights, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 485, 487 (2007).

Somewhat more cynically, the opponents of any change may also need to be
appeased in order to pass an amendment.
165
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must be separated from the prejudice and bias. In order to do so, it
is essential to examine the 166evidence surrounding the connection
between mental disabilities.
A. Section 384-b's definitions of "mental illnesses" and
"mental retardation" Describe a broad array of
disabilities characterized by highly variable
symptoms, intelligence, and adaptive functions
In no sense do the terms "mental retardation" or "mental
illness," as defined by § 384-b, or understood in the medical
community, comprise a homogenous group. 167 The DSM recently
replaced the term "mental retardation" with "intellectual
disability." 168 The definition of the term, however, remained
largely the same and mirrors the definition of "mentally retarded"
in § 384-b. 169 The term "intellectual disability" comprises a wide
variety of discrete diagnoses 17' and reflects a broad range of
intelligence, adaptive functions, and other symptoms. 171 "Mental
illness," as defined in § 384-b is even broader, encompassing the
172
entirety of the D SM.
166

Cf Brandon R. White, Using LearnedHelplessnessto Understandthe Effects

of PosttraumaticStress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder on Refugees
and Explain Why These Disorders Should Qualify as Extraordinary
Circumstances Excusing Untimely Asylum Applications, 64 Buff. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2016).
167 Barry J. Ackerson, Parentswith Serious andPersistentMental Illness: Issues
in Assessment and Services, 48 Soc. WORK 187, 190 (2003); McConnell, supra
note 152, at 304; Watkins, supra note 9, at 1451.
168 Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, IntellectualDisability Fact Sheet 1 (2013), available
at:
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Intellectual /2ODisability /2OFact /20
Sheet.pdf [hereinafter "APA Fact Sheet"].
169 APA Fact Sheet, supranote 168, at 1.
170 Ackerson, supra note 167, at 190; Kaiser, supranote 124, at 7.
171Ackerson, supra note 167,at 190; Collentine, supra note 124, at 537.
172 See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter "DSM-V"].
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Intellectually disabilities range in severity and are grouped
173
into three categories: mildly, moderately, and severely disabled.
Severely intellectually disabled individuals comprise between five
and ten percent of the intellectually disabled community. 174 These
individuals have serious deficits in adaptive skills and an IQ of 35
or lower. 175 Individuals in this group generally
require a large
176
amount of support, if not institutionalization.
Moderately intellectually disabled individuals account for
about ten percent of all intellectual disabilities. 177 Individuals in
this group have IQs between thirty-five and forty-nine and
178
significant, but less severe, deficits in adaptive skills.
Moderately intellectually disabled
individuals are also better able
179
to develop their adaptive skills.
The largest group of intellectually disabled individuals are
those with mild disabilities.180 These individuals have IQs between
fifty and seventy. 181 The level of adaptive skills can be quite
variable for individuals in this group.182 Often their deficits are
very low or nearly nonexistent.183 This group is also notable for
responsiveness to treatment and education. 114 With assistance,
many individuals in this group can greatly improve their adaptive
skills and mental functioning. 185

173 Collentine,
174
175

supranote 124, at 538.

Id.
1d.

Id. at 539; Leigh MacDonald, Do Parents with Learning Disabilitieshave
Adequate Parenting Skills to Safeguard Their Children, 15 J. NEONATAL
NURSING 212, 212-13 (2009).
177 Collentine, supranote 124, at 538.
176

178

Jd.

179 Id.

18

Id.; MacDonald, supranote 176, at 212-13.

181 Collentine, supranote 124, at 539.
182 Jd.
183

184

Id.

Id.; MacDonald, supra note 176, at 213.
185 Collentine, supranote 124, at 539.
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B. Mental disability and parenting are related, but the
relationship is difficult to discern and mostly
restricted to very severe and chronic disabilities
Generally, when parents with intellectual disabilities enter
the child welfare system, they do so as a result of allegations of
neglect. 18 6 The most common concern raised in these allegations
involve perceptions of non-specific issues such as poor parenting
skills or the parent's inability to provide adequate care to their
children. 187
It is beyond contention that children of parents with mental
disabilities have some tendency to face more problems than
children of parents without disabilities, many of which may be the
result of poor parenting skills.188 Principal among these problems
is a higher incidence of mental disabilities in children raised by
parents with mental disabilities.189 In addition to formal diagnoses
of mental disabilities, children raised by mentally disabled parents
often experience learning difficulties and exhibit behavior
problems.190 Specifically, these children commonly show
developmental delays, lower academic outcomes, and difficulty
with social relationships.191
To a large extent this is the result of a genetic component of
the disorders.192 Biological predisposition, however, does not
completely explain the correlation.193 The environment a child is
186

Id. at 543; MacDonald, supranote 176, at 213.

187
188
189

McConnell, supra note 152, at 301.

Kaiser, supra note 124, at 11; Nicholson, supranote 156, at 54.
Stephen M. Amrock & Michael Weitzman, ParentalPsychologicalDistress
and Children'sMental Health: Results of a NationalStudy, 14 AM. PEDIATRICS
375, 379 (2014); McConnell, supranote 152, at 304-05.
190 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 19-20.
191McConnell, supra note 152, at 304-305.
192 Cressida Manning & Alain Gregoire, Effects of ParentalMental Illness on
Children, 8 PSYCHIATRY 7, 7 (2008); Nicholson, supranote 156, at 19.
193Nicholson,

supra note 156, at 19-23; see also Kaiser, supra note 124, at 13.
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raised in is equally influential, if not more so. 1 9 4 However,
establishing the nature of the relationship between parent mental
disability and child outcomes is difficult. 195 In addition to a lack of
studies investigating this issue, a number196of factors confound
attempts to establish any direct relationship.
Mental disabilities, by their very nature, affect behavior. 197
It logically follows that the presence of a mental disability may
negatively affect parenting behavior and result in adverse
consequences for children. 198 As would be expected, there is some
evidence that intellectual disabilities are linked to poor parenting
and increased difficulties in learning parenting skills. 199
However, there is not a strong correlation between low IQ
and parenting ability2 °° and numerous studies have demonstrated
that most intellectually disabled parents possess basic parenting
skills.2" 1 Nor does the bulk of the evidence appear to link any
specific disorders or the mere presence of a mental disability to
deficient parenting skills or worse outcomes for children. 202
Rather, the negative relationship between parenting ability and
194 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 21; see also Manning & Gregoire, supra note
192, at 8.
195 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 19-20.
196
Id.; Manning & Gregoire, supranote 192, at 7-9.
197 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 21.
198

Id.

199

Id.; McConnell, supra note 152, at 303.
Elizabeth Lightfoot et. al., The Inclusion of Disability as a Conditionfor
Termination ofParentalRights, 34 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 927, 929 (2010);
McConnell, supra note 152, at 304.
200

201

Maurice A. Feldman & Laurie Case, Teaching Child-Care and Safety Skills

to Parents with IntellectualDisabilities Through Self-Learning, 24 J. INTEL. &
DEV. DISAB. 27, 28 (1999).
202 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 21. There are two minor exceptions to this.

Schizophrenia and depression have been specifically associated with poor
parenting skills. Id. Mothers with schizophrenia and affective disorders have
been shown to display decreased verbal and emotional responsiveness than
parents without mental illnesses. Id. This deficiency has been linked with poor
attachment with children and developmental delays in language, attention, and
social competence in their children. Id.
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mental disabilities seems to be confined to illnesses that are
particularly severe, chronic, and associated with low adaptive
functioning.20 3
Complicating this analysis, individuals with mental
disabilities disproportionately face a number of other risk factors,
including social isolation, little extended family support, poverty,
20 4
low self-esteem, substance abuse, and substandard housing.
These factors are positively related to worse child outcomes and
parenting skills in all parents, regardless of whether the parent has
a mental disability.20 5 Some studies suggest that, when these
factors are controlled for, much of the correlation that does exist
between mental disability and parenting disappears.2 °6
Compared to neglect, allegations of abuse for parents with
intellectual disabilities are relatively uncommon, though not
unheard of 2 7 There is very little evidence linking abuse to a
parent's intellectual disability. 208 While there is some evidence
linking mental illness and child abuse, this relationship is mostly
restricted to certain personality disorders, like anti-social
personality disorder, and depression.20 9 Moreover, like parenting
ability more generally, establishing the nature of this relationship is
very difficult in light of the presence of other comorbid factors,
such as substance abuse and poverty, that are closely correlated
with child abuse.210

Nicholson, supra note 156, at 20.
204 Feldman, supra note 201, at 27; Lightfoot, supra note 200, at 928; Watkins,
supra note 9, at 1449.
203

205 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 22-23.
206 j]d.

McConnell, supra note 152, at 305.
1d. at 301.
209 Nicholson, supra note 156, at 34.
207

208

210 j]d.
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C. Some mentally disabled parents may be unable to
develop parenting skills but this is not a universal
trait of mentally disabled parents
As discussed above, the terms mental illness and
intellectual disabilities describe an incredibly broad and diverse
class of individuals.2 1 1 Included in this class is a great number of
separate diagnoses with variable symptom clusters.2 12 Even within
these separate subclasses, individual variability is immense.21 3
Moreover, mental illness and intellectual disabilities are not
static conditions. 2 4 The symptoms of many mental illnesses can be
alleviated or, in some cases, even extinguished by appropriate
treatment.21 5 Intellectually disabled individuals can increase their
memory and comprehensive capabilities. 2 6 There is very strong
evidence that many parents with intellectual disabilities can learn
and apply new knowledge and skills, parenting skills included.2 1 7
Among programs that have been effective are those teaching basic
childcare (such as bathing, cleaning bottles, and changing diapers),
home safety and emergency response, parent-child interaction and

212

See generally DSM-V, supra note 172.
Kaiser, supra note 124, at 6-7.

213

Id.

214

Pannell, supra note 124, at 1192.
Kerr, supranote 2, at 405.
Feldman, supra note 201, at 28; Kerr, supranote 2, at 405.
McConnell, supra note 152, at 306-307; see also Gwynnyth Llewellyn et al.,

211

215
216
217

Promoting Health and Home Safety for Children of Parents with Intellectual

Disability: A Randomized Controlled Trail, 24
DISABILITIES

RES.

DEVELOPMENTAL

405, 425-28 (2003). Parents with intellectual disabilities obviously

face unique problems and issues, and effective training programs must
sometimes be adapted to meet their needs. Id. This paper will not address these
problems in depth, but briefly, for these parents to find success, programs should
be (1) individually tailored; (2) address the parent's motivation to learn and
focus on topics of interest; (3) conduct training in the situation the parent will
eventually practice the behavior in; (4) feature modeling and positive feedback;
(5) include a maintenance feature. Id. at 307; see also Feldman, supra note 201,
at 28, 38 (study finding audiovisual self-instruction to be successful in teaching
intellectually disabled individuals parenting skills).
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play, general decision making, responding to difficult parenting
218
and social situations, and menu planning and grocery shopping.
While many individuals with mental illnesses and
intellectual disabilities may indeed be unable to learn or develop
parenting skills, this is far from a universal characteristic of mental
illnesses and intellectual disabilities as a group. 219 Nor does the
ability to learn parenting skills appear to be closely related to IQ
scores (with the exception of very severe intellectual disabilities)
or specific mental illnesses. 22' The only reliable predictors of this
group's ability to develop, learn, and utilize new parenting skills
are the quality of the parent-child relationship and past behavior of
the parent, particularly when that history involves violence towards
the child. 22 1 Moreover, the quality of the parent-child relationship
cannot be predicted with standardized testing or psychological
evaluations.2 22

218

McConnell, supra note 152, at 307. It is also important to note that mentally

disabled parents are much more likely to be accused of neglect as opposed to
abuse. Collentine, supra note 124, at 543. Neglect is harm caused by omission
and covers a much broader range of possible harms than the positive acts of
abuse. Compare N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 2015) with §

384-b(8)(a). As such, situations involving neglect are more easily addressed by
education and other services. Collentine, supra note 124, at 543.
219 McConnell, supra note 152, at 307.
22
1Id. at 306-07; Llewellyn, supra note 217, at 425.
221 Lawless, supra note 71, at 514-15; Watkins, supranote 9, at 1451.
222 Lawless, supra note 71, at 514-15; Watkins, supranote 9, at 1453.
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MENTAL DISABILITY SHOULD NOT BE
ENTIRELY ELIMINATED FROM § 384-B AS
GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS, BUT THE STATUTE MUST BE
AMENDED TO ENSURE THAT BOTH THE
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS
AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THEIR
CHILDREN ARE BETTER PROTECTED

With a better understanding of the relationship between
mental disabilities and parenting skills, four problems with New
York's termination statute become apparent. 223 First, § 384-b's
definitions of "mental illness" and "mental retardation" are
overbroad and have the potential to terminate parental rights for
many parents who are able to provide adequate care for their
children. 224 Second, § 384-b offers insufficient guidance on the
content of expert testimony and places far too much weight on an
expert's prediction of future behavior. 225 Third, the statute ignores
the potential of many mentally disabled parents to develop
parenting skills or otherwise benefit from services. 2 26 Finally, §
384-b does not consider the best interests of the children involved
in termination proceedings.2 2 7

223

New York should also consider replacing the phrase "mental retardation"

with "intellectual disability." "Retard" is now often considered a pejorative
term, and New York should follow the APA's lead and modifying its
terminology, see APA Fact Sheet, supranote 168, at 1.
221 Collentine, supranote 124, at 552.
225
Id. at 553; Kaiser, supranote 124, at 21-22.
226 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 201, at 28.
227 Kaiser, supra note 124, at 2.
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A. The definitions of "mental illness" and
"mental retardation" are overbroad and
must be more narrowly defined to reach only
those parents who are unlikely to be able to
provide adequate care for their children

The evidence discussed above demonstrates that the
connection between mental disability and ability to parent is, at
best, tenuous.228 Importantly, what evidence does support a
connection applies only to particularly severe and chronic
disorders.229 While New York's termination statute does attempt to
tie the parent's mental condition to capacity to parent, § 384-b
includes no language to narrow the class of parents with mental
disabilities that the statute reaches. 23" As a result, the statute has
the potential to sweep many undeserving parents within its
scope.231 Some parents may actually be unable to provide adequate
care for their children because of a mental disability.232 However,
while we should acknowledge that it is better to err on the side of
caution when children's lives are at stake, § 384-b is unjustifiably
broad.233
Child protection statutes are, to some degree, purposefully
vague.234 This creates flexibility and permits judges to exercise
broad discretion in deciding child welfare cases. 235 In the run-ofthe-mill case, this flexibility and discretion is desirable.236 Because
the number of potential conflicting interests and policy concerns
involved requires extensive balancing, situations involving child
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

See supraPart V.B.
Nicholson, supra note 156, at 20.
See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6) (McKinney 2015).
See Lightfoot, supranote 200, at 933.
Nicholson, supra note 156, at 20.
See Bean, supra note 42, at 336.
McConnell, supra note 152, at 307-08.

2 35

Jd.

236

See Jones, supranote 164, at 489-90.
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welfare are not conducive to generic solutions.23 7 Flexible statutes
with broad judicial discretion allow an individualized
consideration of each case on its own facts and particular
eccentricities.23 8
When termination proceedings are based on grounds of
mental illness or retardation, however, this discretion opens a
conduit for officials to give effect to biases and presumptions.2 3 9
The legal players in child welfare proceedings are usually not
experienced or trained to work with individuals with intellectual
disabilities or mental illnesses and judges often hold biases against
those with mental disabilities. 240 The great discretion judges
exercise in termination proceedings allows biases (whether they be
those held by the judge himself or those held by other participants
in the proceedings) to greatly influence outcomes.2 4 1
Judges' discretion under § 384-b should be more limited
when the grounds for termination are mental disability. Section
384-b must be amended to limit its reach to those parents who can,
with some degree of certainty, actually be determined to be unable
to provide adequate care for their children. Other state termination
statutes that include mental disability as grounds for termination
offer some guidance on possible approaches to this narrowing.
Washington requires that the parent's disability be so "severe and
chronic" that it places the child in imminent harm. 242 Mississippi

237

Hilary Baldwin, Termination of ParentalRights: Statistical Study and

ProposedSolutions,
28 J. LEGIS. 239, 239-40 (2002).
238
1 d.; McConnell, supra note 152, at 308.
239 McConnell, supra note 152, at 307-08.
240 Kerr, supranote 2, at 403-04.
241 McConnell, supra note 152, at 307-08.

§ 13.34.180(1)(e)(ii) (West 2015) ("Psychological
incapacity or mental deficiency of the parent that is so severe and chronic as to
render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended
periods of time or for periods of time that present a risk of imminent harm to the
child, and documented unwillingness of the parent to receive and complete
treatment or documentation that there is no treatment that can render the parent
capable of providing proper care for the child in the near future ....).
242 WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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requires a history of behavior connected to a severe disability. 243
Wisconsin utilizes a period of recent institutionalization as a proxy
for severity of the disability.244 Any of these schemes would be an
appropriate alternative to § 384-b's definition.
B. Section 384-b must establish stronger
standards for expert testimony on mentally
disabled parents' present and future ability
to provide adequate care for their children
Another issue with New York's statute is its reliance on
unreliable expert testimony to prove future behavior. Outside of
termination
proceedings,
clinical predictions
of future
245
dangerousness are notoriously inaccurate. As many as two thirds
of these predictions prove to be inaccurate and the American
Psychiatric Association itself acknowledges that unreliable
predictions of dangerousness are "an established fact within the
§ 93-15-103(3)(e) (West 2015) ("The parent exhibits
ongoing behavior which would make it impossible to return the child to the
parent's care and custody ... [b]ecause the parent has a diagnosable condition
unlikely to change within a reasonable time such as . . . severe mental
deficiencies or mental illness .... ").
244 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(3) (West 2015) ("(a) The parent is presently, and
for a cumulative total period of at least 2 years within the 5 years immediately
prior to the filing of the petition has been [institutionalized] on account of
mental illness .... developmental ... , or other like incapacities...; (b) The
condition of the parent is likely to continue indefinitely; and (c) The child is not
being provided with adequate care by a relative who has legal custody of the
child, or by a parent or a guardian.").
245 Wasow, supra note 161, at 211-12. Psychiatrists agree on diagnose only
about half of the time and there is a weak correlation between prognosis and
outcomes. Id. When actual symptoms are controlled for, a psychiatrist's belief
that a patient is poor tends to result in a more severe diagnosis with a worse
prognosis. Id. Psychologists usually over-predict violent behavior in civil
commitments, while their predictions for child abuse have high false-positive
rate. Id. Predictions on long-term child development are only correct about half
of the time. Id.
243 MISS. CODE ANN.
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profession., 246 For predictions of future ability to parent this
difficulty is further complicated by a dearth of evidence and a lack
of consensus in the social sciences on what characteristics a "good
parent" posses.24 7

Compounding the general problems with predictions of
behavior, § 384-b places only minimal demands on the content
required from an expert's testimony. 248 The statute includes no
requirement for a functional assessment of the parent or
observation of the parent with the child.2 49 Instead, experts may
testify on the strength of a single interview or examination of the
parent and base their determination entirely on an IQ score.25 °
From that score, the expert attempts to infer a parent's ability to
presently provide care to their children and their capacity to
251
improve and learn parenting skills.
As discussed above, IQ scores are only loosely, if at all,
correlated with parenting skills and an ability to learn them.252 Nor
have any other psychological exams been shown to accurately
predict parenting ability. 253 More critically, § 384-b's guidance for
expert testimony entirely ignores one of the only reliable predictors
of parenting skills-a close parent-child relationship.254
Despite the difficulties of predicting future behavior,
requiring evidence of a parent's likely future behavior does serve
to narrow the class and, with some alterations, could help to focus
the grounds on those situations where termination would be
appropriate. Narrowing the class of mentally disabled individuals
reached through the statutory definitions, as discussed above, will
Margolin, supra note 6, at 158 (2007).
See Collentine, supra note 124, at 544-45; Watkins, supranote 9, at 1449.
See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(6)(e) (McKinney 2015).
249
Id.
250 Id. If the parent refuses to submit to an examination or is otherwise
unavailable, experts are even permitted to testify solely on the basis of
documentary evidence without observing the parent at all. Id.
251 McConnell, supra note 152, at 308.
252 Lightfoot, supra note 200, at 929.
253 Lawless, supra note 71, at 514-15; Watkins, supranote 9, at 1451.
246
247
248
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serve these ends to a large degree.2 55 Additionally, experts should
be encouraged to use more probative evidence of parenting ability
and § 384-b should require that experts conduct a functional
assessment of the parent and observe the parent with the child
whenever possible.256 New Hampshire requires the testimony of
two licensed psychiatrists or clinical psychologists to establish the
presence of a mental disability. 257 A similar scheme in New York
that explicitly requires concurrence between the two experts would
also help to remove some uncertainty.
C. During the fact-finding hearing, the State
should be required to demonstrate that it
engaged in "diligent efforts to encourage and
25 8
strengthen the parental relationship
before parental rights can be terminated on
the basis of mental disability
New York should also amend § 384-b to require the state to
demonstrate it engaged in diligent efforts to reunite a mentally
disabled parent and child before a parent's rights are terminated.
New York is the only state that allows a court to terminate a
mentally disabled parent's parental rights without proof that
reunification services were provided or a prior court decision that
such efforts were not required. 259 This alone is strong evidence that
something is not quite right with § 384-b.
Underlying the lack of a requirement for diligent efforts for
mentally disabled individuals is a presumption that such parents
would be unable to take advantage of or benefit from any services
and that any efforts to reunite the parent and child would be
See supraPart VI.A.
See Lawless, supra note 71, at 514-15; Watkins, supra note 9, at 1451.
257 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (2015).
258 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a), (8)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2015).
259 Margolin, supra note 6, at 150.
255
256

36

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXXIV

wasted.2 6' This presumption is flawed.2 61 The view of mental

disabilities as immutable was discarded long ago.2 62 Many parents
can and do improve and alleviate the symptoms of their disorders
with appropriate treatment.263 Many parents with mental
disabilities also can and do benefit greatly from parental skills
training and education.264
Moreover, even accepting (against the weight of evidence)
that mentally disabled parents are usually less fit than parents
without mental disabilities, it cannot be denied that mentally
disabled parents often face more parenting challenges, aside from
their disabilities, than parents without disabilities.265 Many of these
challenges-such as social isolation, poverty, substance abuse, and
substandard housing-are easily addressed by providing the parent
with services and other assistance.266
The inaccuracy of expert assessments and predictions of
parenting ability offers further support for the wisdom of providing
reunification services to parents with mental disabilities. How can
we give such weight to such speculation, while at the same time
deny parents the opportunity to prove these guesses wrong?
Requiring diligent reunification efforts would not only protect a
mentally disabled parent from an inaccurate diagnosis but also give
experts more data from which to make a diagnosis in the first
place.

260
261

See Wasow, supranote 161, at 207-08.

Id.

Kerr, supranote 2, at 407-08.
Kaiser, supra note 124, at 9.
264
1d. at 27-28.
26' Nicholson, supra note 156, at 22-23.
266 Wasow, supra note 161, at 186. Among the services that could assist are
housing services, employment services, transportation services, drug and alcohol
treatment, and child care services. Id.
262
263

2015-2016

TPR for Mentally Disabled Parents in N.Y.
D. A dispositional hearing should be mandatory
for termination of parental rights
proceedings on mental disability grounds

Even when a parent is unfit because of a mental disability,
there are many situations where termination is not in the best
interest of the child.2 67 New York is the only state that does not
always consider the best interests of the child in termination
proceedings for mentally disabled parents.2 68 Like New York's
unique failure to provide reunification efforts for mentally disabled
parents, this deviation is strong
evidence, by itself, that New York
2 69
is doing something wrong.
Permanently severing the parent-child bond by terminating
parental rights is traumatic for both parties and potentially
devastating to the child.27 ° This is no different for mentally
disabled parents and their children.271 In fact, there are some
indications that the typical bond between mentally disabled parents
and their children may even be stronger than the bond between
children and parents without mental disabilities.272
The justification behind termination of parental rights, as
recognized by both the AFSA and § 384-b, is that, while
termination is bad, extended foster care is worse. 273 Though
termination is a last resort, adoption is preferable to extended
267

Kaiser, supra note 124, at 23-24.

Margolin, supra note 6, at 161. New York is unique in its bifurcation of
termination proceedings. Id. Nearly every other state combines the content in
New York's fact-finding and dispositional hearings into a single hearing and
considers the grounds for termination and the best interests of the child at the
same time. Id.
268

269

See supra Part VI.C.

270 Id.

271

McConnell, supra note 152, at 306. Adults who were raised by parents with

mental disabilities consistently report positive outcomes and strong attachments
to their disabled parents. Id.
272
273

Collentine, supranote 124, at 558-59.
42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012); Zubok, supra note 32, at 596-97.
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foster care.274 This premise is well grounded in evidence.2 7 5
Permanency plays an important role in children's development2 7 6
and children in foster care are much more likely to suffer
significant abuse and neglect than other children.2 7 7 Thus, to avoid
prolonged stays in foster care, termination may be appropriate
when adoption is a possibility.27 8 The strength of this rationale
disappears, though, when adoption is unlikely or impossible.2 7 9
Children of parents with mental disabilities are more likely
to have disabilities themselves.2 8 Finding adoptive families for
children with disabilities is notoriously problematic.2 8 1 Because of
this, when parental rights are severed for children with disabilities,
these children are at a high risk of becoming "legal orphans" and
spending the rest of their childhood in various foster homes.28 2
Resorting to termination when adoption is unlikely is contrary to
the purpose of § 384-b and the AFSA and unnecessarily
traumatizes the child.2 83
Terminating parental rights may also be contrary to the best
interests of the child when the child is older.2 84 As children age,
much of the danger from inadequate parenting, and thus the
rationale for terminating parental rights, dissipates. 28 5 Terminating
parental rights when a child is no longer especially vulnerable
serves no purpose and unnecessarily traumatizes the child and
demeans the parent.28 6

274 j]d.

Kaiser, supra note 124, at 22-23.
Nicholson, supra note 156, at 27-28.
277 Kaiser, supra note 124, at 23.
278 See id.
279 Margolin, supra note 6, at 165-68.
280 McConnell, supra note 152, at 304-05.
281 Kaiser, supra note 124, at 23.
275
276
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Id.

213 Margolin, supra note 6, at 167-68.
284
285

286

Id. at 166-67.

Id.; see also Amrock & Weitzman, supranote 189, at 379.
Margoline, supranote 6, at 167-68.
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There is no reason to forgo a dispositional hearing prior to
terminating a mentally disabled parent's rights.287 This
fundamental unfairness is reason enough to require such a hearing.
However, the increased difficulty in securing adoption for many
children of mentally disabled parents makes the consideration of a
child's best interests even more important. 288 Additionally, in light
of the unreliable nature of expert testimony, avoiding termination
when adoption is unlikely leaves open the possibility of the parent
improving enough to regain custody.289
VII.

CONCLUSION

None of the above is to say that every actor in New York's
legal system routinely and purposefully discriminates against
mentally disabled parents. To the contrary, there are many
examples of enlightened judges correctly denying termination
petitions for mentally disabled parents.29°
In re W. W. Children offers an example of such an
incident. 291 The respondent mother in W.W. Children, an
intellectually disabled woman, had her children removed and
placed in foster care.292 The social service agency determined that
the mother's disability rendered her unable to ever provide
adequate care for her children. 293 Relying on this determination,
the agency declined to make any effort to reunite the mother with
her children.294 With the agency failing to provide any help, the
mother found assistance in improving her parenting ability on her
own. 29 5 The agency eventually filed a petition to terminate parental
287

Id. at 161.
Id. at 166-67.
289 See supraPart VI.B.
2
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See, e.g., In re Loraida G., 701 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Fam. Ct. 1999).
In re W.W. Children, 736 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Fam. Ct. 2001).
292 Id. at 569.
290

291

293 Id. at
294
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Id. at 570-71.

40

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXXIV

rights.296 By this time, although the mother was still unable to care
for her children on her own, she had shown some improvement
both in her ability to independently care for herself and, with
significant assistance, to care for her children.297
Considering the petition to terminate the mother's parental
rights, Judge Claire T. Pearce of the New York Family Court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother was
mentally retarded.298 Judge Pearce also recognized that § 384-b
imposed no requirement on the agency to show it made
reunification efforts.29 9 Judge Pearce noted, however, that the
mother had "demonstrated significant progress" in her ability to
provide for her own care and welfare.3"' Moreover, she had
"demonstrated perseverance in the face of persisting rejections and
personal adversity" and "a single-mindedness of purpose and
determination [to regain custody of her children] seldom seen in
'normal' respondents. 30 1
Despite two experts testifying that the mother would be
unable to adequately care for her children in the foreseeable future,
Judge Pearce declined to terminate her parental rights.30 2 In light of
the effort the mother had expended to improve herself and regain
custody of her children, Judge Pearce found the agencies failure to
make "diligent efforts" reflected negatively on the experts'
testimony.30 3 Accordingly, Judge Pearce held that the agency had
not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the mother
would be unable to provide adequate care for her children in the
foreseeable future.30 4
In re W. W. Children shows what New York's courts can
and should do to protect the rights of mentally disabled parents.
29 6

569.

29

570, 572.

1 d. at

7 1d. at
2 98
1 d. at

573.
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1d. at 576.
3
11 Id. at 570.
301 Jd.
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But with a different judge, that case could easily have turned out
very differently.3 0 5 Judge Pearce would have been well within the
bounds of the law if she had found3 0the
experts' testimony credible
6
and terminated the mother's rights.
We cannot let a parent's fundamental right to raise and care
for his or her child hinge on the fortuitousness of drawing a
compassionate judge that understands the issues faced by mentally
disabled individuals. At the very least, New York owes mentally
disabled parents the same statutory protections that it affords
parents who abused or neglected their children.
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